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Abstract
This article provides an overview of the South African government’s evolving position on the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P). While the country was an advocate of R2P in the run-up to the 
2005 United Nations (UN) World Summit and the related idea of non-indifference in Africa, 
its conduct while serving as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) and subsequent developments have raised questions about its continued commitment 
to these principles. In particular, Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya proved to be a turning 
point. It is argued that while South Africa continues to support the broad idea of civilian 
protection, it is in favour of a consultative, regional approach and has become increasingly 
critical of what it views as the selective application and militarisation of the R2P. In trying to 
make sense of the apparent contradictions in South Africa’s position, it is necessary to situate 
the debate against the background of broader tensions in its foreign policy, particularly around 
the promotion of human rights. These, in turn, are linked to divergent and multiple foreign 
policy identities that the post-apartheid state is still coming to terms with.
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Introduction
This article traces South Africa’s position on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) from the 
Mandela era, when the country was regarded as a champion of human rights in Africa, to 
the current climate where the African National Congress (ANC)-led government has 
expressed growing scepticism about R2P and related institutions like the International 
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Criminal Court (ICC). In trying to find answers to why there has been this shift, the arti-
cle commences with a brief discussion of the role of human rights in South Africa’s for-
eign policy and considers the normative contribution the country has made to the 
entrenchment of R2P and related concepts like non-indifference on the African conti-
nent. This is followed by an overview of the South African critique of R2P, particularly 
around United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 on Libya, which 
serves as a useful indicator of the changes in its approach to R2P.
One way of interpreting the shift is to situate it against the backdrop of South Africa’s 
multiple foreign policy identities – including some that are deliberately nurtured by the 
government and others that are the result of role designations by the international com-
munity. These include being, first and foremost, an African state, an emerging power and 
regional leader while at the same time living up to its constitutional obligations of being 
a liberal democracy. This, in turn, is tied to two divergent strands within the anti-apart-
heid struggle that live on in the ANC government: a commitment to liberal values like 
democracy and human rights versus South–South solidarity and anti-Western sentiments. 
Relatedly, South Africa’s foreign policy has to balance Western expectations of the coun-
try as a human rights leader and champion of liberal values in Africa with alliances with 
the rest of Africa and states like Russia and China, who have very different expectations. 
At the same time, the tremendous domestic challenges put pressure on the government to 
follow a pragmatic foreign policy, with economic and developmental interests trumping 
more idealist pursuits like the promotion of human rights.
Human rights as the cornerstone of South Africa’s foreign 
policy
Any discussion of South Africa’s approach to R2P needs to be undertaken against the 
backdrop of the central position that the protection of human rights occupied in the 
country’s post-apartheid foreign policy. The emergence of a democratic South Africa in 
1994 was accompanied by efforts to position itself as an African state with a strong 
commitment to multilateralism, international law, respect for human rights and democ-
racy and South–South cooperation. Nelson Mandela highlighted the new ANC-led gov-
ernment’s foreign policy priorities when he wrote, ‘South Africa’s future foreign 
relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core of interna-
tional relations’.1 The government continues to stress that human rights remains at the 
centre of its foreign policy. An aide-memoire to the President of the UN General 
Assembly, in motivation of South Africa’s candidature of the Human Rights Council, 
states, ‘It should be underlined that South Africa by its very nature and for historical 
reasons is among the countries within the United Nations that takes the international 
human rights agenda very seriously’.2 Similarly, the preamble of the 2011 foreign pol-
icy white paper – Building a Better World: The diplomacy of Ubuntu – emphasises that 
‘Since 1994, the international community has looked to South Africa to play a leading 
role in championing values of human rights’,3 especially in Africa. Despite all the pro-
human rights rhetoric, however, in practice there has been a definite shift in foreign 
policy from an explicit focus on the protection of human rights to a more ambiguous 
position that at times seems to be supportive of the primacy of state sovereignty. This is 
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in direct contradiction to the emphasis on ‘batho pele’ (putting people first) in the for-
eign policy white paper, which seems to suggest that state sovereignty and rights are 
secondary to those of citizens. In addition, the strong Africanist strand in South Africa’s 
foreign policy means that the country has to be particularly careful when handling 
human rights issues in Africa.
The African continent continues to be a central focus of South Africa’s foreign policy. 
The reasons for this can be found both in historical relations and in South Africa’s own self 
interest. During the apartheid era, South Africa’s approach to the region was one of military 
destabilisation, at a tremendous cost to its neighbours. After 1994, there was a general feel-
ing among the ruling elite that the new government had a responsibility to rectify the dam-
age caused during apartheid and show their gratitude to neighbouring countries that had 
supported the liberation struggle. At the same time, it was clearly in South Africa’s interest 
to promote peace, stability and economic development in the rest of the continent. The 
challenge became doing so without appearing to have hegemonic intentions. In addition, 
South Africa needs the continent’s support if it wants to fulfil its ambition of being the 
spokesperson for Africa on the international stage. This means not behaving in ways that 
would open it up to criticism from other African governments, which includes not publicly 
condemning fellow African leaders for human rights violations.
An African approach to protecting civilians
Despite the fact that the debate around R2P is dominated by Western voices,4 it has been 
claimed that R2P has African roots, ‘both in terms of its conceptualisation and imple-
mentation’.5 After the end of the Cold War, it was the Rwandan genocide that provided 
the impetus for the international community to revisit the idea of intervention to protect 
the lives of civilians. It can also be traced back to the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim’s suggestion that ‘the OAU should take 
the lead in transcending the traditional view of sovereignty, building on the African val-
ues of kinship and solidarity and the notion that “every African is his brother’s keeper”’.6 
With the creation of the African Union (AU), African states had already reconceptualised 
sovereignty away from ‘sovereignty as non-intervention’ towards ‘sovereignty as respon-
sibility’. South Africa has been critical of the ‘tendency of Western actors to see their 
values and interests as representing the only possible incarnation of R2P’,7 arguing that 
in fact the notion of non-indifference, regarded as a forerunner of R2P, was included in 
the AU Charter in response to the lack of action taken by Western powers in the face of 
human rights atrocities taking place in Africa.
Before the R2P framework gained broad international acceptance in 2005, South 
Africa was active in negotiating the move from non-intervention to non-indifference in 
Africa.8 At the time, then President Nelson Mandela articulated that ‘we cannot abuse the 
concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to 
intervene when behind those sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to pro-
tect tyranny’.9 The country was instrumental in the inclusion of a number of articles in 
the AU’s Constitutive Act, including Article 4(h) that refers to ‘the right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’.10 This was 
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in stark contrast to its forerunner, the OAU’s emphasis on non-interference and respect 
for sovereignty. Relatedly, South Africa was also pivotal in developing the AU’s peace 
and security architecture, including the Peace and Security Council, which would bear 
primary responsibility for implementing the continent’s version of R2P. While the term 
R2P is not explicitly referred to in any of the AU documents, the three duties prescribed 
by the norm (prevention, reaction and reconstruction) are reflected in both the AU’s 
Constitutive Act and its Peace and Security Council Protocol.
Furthermore, the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) between 2004 and 
2007, which explicitly referred to the protection of civilians, is an example of how R2P 
has been accepted in the organisation as justifying an intervention.11 It is important to 
highlight, however, that the right or responsibility to intervene in a member state is con-
fined to the AU and does not extend to actors external to Africa. This is based on the 
belief that regional and sub-regional organisations should play an active role in maintain-
ing peace and security in their respective regions. South Africa is very much in favour of 
African-led humanitarian intervention, as part of a broader commitment to the notion of 
‘African solutions to African problems’, and the idea that African states have greater 
legitimacy to intervene than external powers.12 Subsequently, during the 2005 World 
Summit, South Africa played an important normative role by linking the emerging R2P 
norm to existing African ideas such as non-indifference. The country was also instru-
mental in getting buy-in from fellow African states as well as India and Latin America, 
who were initially resistant.
While South Africa played an important role in the development of R2P, it has been 
criticised heavily for paying lip service to the principle, but effectively undermining it in 
practice. It has, in turn, criticised what it regards as a militarisation of the R2P framework 
– referring to the use of force as a pretext for regime change. As holds true for the other 
states discussed in this volume, there is little if any disagreement about the first and sec-
ond pillars. From a South African perspective, the debate around R2P is predominantly 
centred on the issue of the implementation of Pillar III,13 namely, what form intervention 
by the international community should take and under what circumstances the use of 
force is justified. The fact that the R2P norm is still in a formative phase means that dif-
ferent interpretations are inevitable.
It is important to note that the limited domestic debate about R2P has been conducted 
mainly by government, think tanks, academia and some non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). It is not a public debate in which broader society has become engaged, save for 
some instances where the media has questioned South Africa’s peacekeeping motiva-
tions, as was the case with the deployment of troops to the Central African Republic 
(CAR). This is in line with a general lack of public debate about foreign policy, with 
most citizens being primarily concerned with domestic challenges such as unemploy-
ment. This was confirmed by the findings of a recent foreign policy public opinion sur-
vey: asked to rank a number of pressing domestic versus global issues, respondents 
identified unemployment as the number 1 concern (at 34% overall), while global issues 
like conflict in Africa, climate change and global inequality were all cited by 5 per cent 
or less of respondents.14
South Africa is strongly in favour of a more multi-dimensional approach to R2P, focus-
ing on consultation, mediation and dialogue. The government believes that an approach of 
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engagement rather than coercion is the best way to encourage other states to adhere to 
international human rights standards. According to Landsberg,15 this has allowed the 
country to avoid being perceived as a ‘bullying hegemon’ trying to impose R2P by force. 
This is in line with its broader approach to conflict resolution that includes prevention, 
resolution and post-conflict transitional justice, reconstruction and peacebuilding.16 This 
has its roots in South Africa’s historical experience, with the country’s own peaceful nego-
tiated settlement regarded as the preferred model for addressing conflict and based on an 
unwavering conviction that conflicts can only be resolved through the participation of all 
stakeholders. This is also reflected in the positions South Africa has taken in the Human 
Rights Council,17 where it has consistently refrained from condemning governments for 
human rights abuses, with the exception of Israel.
On the other hand, it is also a response to the isolation South Africa experienced in 
1995, after then President Nelson Mandela condemned Nigerian President Sani Abacha’s 
execution of human rights activists and called for sanctions against the country. As a 
consequence, South Africa came under heavy criticism from other African states, includ-
ing accusations that it behaved in an un-African manner and continued to serve Western 
and White interests. This is a lesson that the ANC-led government has not forgotten and 
one that lies at the heart of its reluctance to openly condemn African governments for 
human rights abuses. Instead, it prefers to employ and approach that is sometimes 
referred to as constructive engagement. The case of former President Thabo Mbeki’s 
quiet diplomacy towards Zimbabwe is perhaps the most frequently cited example. In 
response to the post-2000 crisis in that country, marked by political repression, economic 
disintegration, widespread state-sponsored violence and societal collapse, the South 
African government refused to condemn Mugabe’s regime and instead argued that an 
approach of behind-the-scenes engagement was more appropriate. As Hamill and 
Hoffman, however, point out:
one of the tragic ironies of this situation is that the very phenomena Mbeki warned of if a more 
punitive policy was pursued – refugees, economic collapse, and political breakdown – have all 
come to pass in the era of ‘quiet diplomacy’.18
South Africa’s discomfort with R2P is also linked to what it regards as its inconsistent 
application. Mamdani’s argument that ‘the new global regime of R2P bifurcates the 
international system between sovereign states whose citizens have political rights, and 
de facto trusteeship territories whose populations are seen as wards in need of external 
protection’19 speaks to this concern. He elaborates by pointing out that the R2P regime 
reserves condemnation for one type of mass violence that targets civilians – genocide – 
while other forms of mass violence such as inter-state violence or counter-insurgency are 
regarded as ‘what states do’.20 He further notes that labelling violence in a particular way 
– we need to only be reminded of the debate around whether or not to call what happened 
in Rwanda in 1994 genocide or not – serves to ‘demonize[s] the perpetrators of one kind 
of mass violence, and at the same time confer[s] impunity on perpetrators of other forms 
of mass violence’.21 It is this hypocrisy, this selective application of principles that is at 
the heart of South Africa’s critique not only of R2P but also of the functioning of the 
Security Council and the current system of global governance as a whole. The fact that it 
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is the Security Council and effectively its five permanent members who can invoke the 
R2P doctrine is at the heart of scepticism about the doctrine and its implementation.
Despite its clearly stated preference for negotiated solutions, South Africa is not, in 
principle, against any form of intervention. It has supported an interventionist form of 
R2P at the regional level, and its role in the AU-mandated missions in Darfur and Burundi 
shows that it is willing to participate in consent-based intervention and indicates a strong 
preference for a regional approach. A South African ambassador summarises the per-
ceived inconsistency on R2P as follows: ‘[on] values we are clear: you can’t kill civil-
ians. But we have issues with the mechanisms and sequencing that the West prioritises’.22 
The problem, however, lies with exactly those situations where diplomacy or consensual 
military intervention was not effective. The Libyan situation, discussed below, was a 
case in point. It is in these instances that South Africa’s reluctance to engage in a more 
robust form of intervention becomes untenable.
The Libya fiasco: tipping the scales against R2P
During its first term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC (2007–2008), South 
Africa’s controversial votes on human rights abuses in, among others, Zimbabwe and 
Myanmar23 – justified on the basis of procedural objections – seemed to contradict South 
Africa’s earlier position on the primacy of the UNSC with regard to R2P.24 It was, how-
ever, its second term (2011–2012), and the vote on Libya in particular,25 that can be seen 
as a turning point for South Africa in terms of its position on R2P.26 Some scholars27 note 
that Libya showcased the tension between South Africa’s support for the conflicting 
norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, on one hand, and humanitarian intervention 
to protect civilians, on the other. In 2011, South Africa, together with the other two 
African non-permanent members of the UNSC, Gabon and Nigeria, supported Resolution 
1973 (2011) calling for humanitarian intervention in Libya. This was in direct contradic-
tion to the position of the AU ad hoc high-level committee – of which South Africa’s 
President Jacob Zuma was a member – that had been tasked with finding a negotiated 
settlement to the crisis.28 This highlighted the complexities of the multilateral arena, 
where states have diverging and often contradictory alliances that play out in different 
ways, depending on the issue at hand. South Africa’s initial support for Resolution 1973 
generated considerable controversy domestically – both within the ranks of the ANC and 
outside of it. Government responded by subsequently condemning the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention, arguing that Western powers had used 
Resolution 1973, aimed at the protection of civilians, as a pretext for regime change. 
According to Pretoria, there had been no indication that the agreement to a no-fly zone 
would mean that the possibility of a negotiated settlement involving Qaddafi was off the 
table. Towards the end of 2011, South Africa’s ambassador to the UN, Baso Sangqu, 
articulated South Africa’s reservations about R2P in a United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) debate on the protection of civilians. He noted:
South Africa has registered its concerns publicly with the manner in which efforts employed by 
the Security Council to protect civilians have been exploited in the recent past … Regime 
change, arming civilians and harming civilians cannot be justified in the name of protecting 
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civilians and those entrusted with such responsibility must uphold their responsibility while 
protecting …29
Africa and Pretorius point out that ‘These shifting responses30 to the Libyan conflict may 
be indicative of an unsteady normative base in South Africa’s foreign policy. The coex-
isting values of a regard for sovereignty and the aversion to “unconstitutional changes of 
power” were placed in uncomfortable proximity to the value of human dignity, and the 
right to life’.31
The result of the Libyan case was that South Africa was now seen as having firmly 
joined the ranks of R2P sceptics, including its BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) partners, all of whom had abstained from the Libya vote. Despite percep-
tions that following its disillusionment with the implementation of the Libyan resolution 
South Africa consistently voted against R2P while serving on the UNSC, the country in 
fact voted in favour of Security Council resolutions invoking R2P and calling on the 
governments of Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, the CAR, Yemen, Libya, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi to uphold their responsibility to 
protect their citizens.32 It must be noted, however, that the resolutions supported all 
referred to Pillar I and in some cases Pillar II, but never to Pillar III. This underlines the 
notion that South Africa is not against R2P in principle, but against resolutions sanction-
ing the use of force that are framed as R2P. At the same time, South Africa has been 
accused of hypocrisy and double standards itself. For example, the decision by the Zuma 
government to unilaterally send South African soldiers to the CAR, without support from 
other states in the region or the AU, did little to legitimate Pretoria’s accusations of 
Western double standards. Media reports that 13 South African soldiers were killed in 
clashes with rebels in the CAR raised questions about the motivations for deploying the 
troops (it was speculated that mining interests were the main reason), especially when it 
emerged that troops had been deployed without public knowledge.
Regarding the apparent convergence between South Africa and the other BRICS states 
– Russia and China in particular – around the use of force in aid of R2P, respect for sov-
ereignty and disregard for external interference in the domestic affairs of a state, their 
motivations are arguably quite different. It could be argued that South Africa’s critique of 
R2P is more procedural than substantive.33 While South Africa is supportive of the notion 
that sovereignty at times needs to be suspended in order to protect civilians, it has a prob-
lem with the selective application of the norm and the tendency to use force for reasons 
that go beyond the mere protection of civilians. This builds on a historically informed 
scepticism about the west’s selective application of R2P and its intellectual predecessor, 
humanitarian intervention, when it comes to Africa. This is different from the Chinese and 
Russian insistence of non-interference, based predominantly on the recognition of sover-
eignty as the most important norm in international relations. South Africa’s position thus 
diverges from both the Western position as well as from the Russian and Chinese ones.
Calls to withdraw from the ICC
Related to its increased scepticism about R2P, South Africa has also become a vocal 
critic of its counterpart, the ICC.34 Following the government’s failure to arrest Sudanese 
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President al-Bashir while he was attending an AU summit in Johannesburg in June 2015, 
despite its obligations under the Rome Statue (not only is South Africa a signatory, but it 
has also ratified the treaty domestically), the ANC has subsequently called for South 
Africa’s withdrawal from the ICC and for other African states to join it.35 The argument 
made most consistently to justify the decision to allow al-Bashir to leave the country was 
the alleged impact this would have had on South Africa’s relations with the rest of the 
continent. Chairman of the ANC sub-committee on International Relations, arguably the 
most important foreign policy decision-making body in the country, contended that had 
the decision been taken to arrest al-Bashir, ‘definitely we would have isolated ourselves 
as South Africa’.36 The decision was in line with a decision taken at an AU summit in 
January 2012, which urged member states not to honour ICC warrants for the arrest of 
al-Bashir. Such justifications only further serves to entrench the claim that African states 
place more value on protecting morally corrupt leaders and regimes than protecting 
civilians.
Special adviser to the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Eddie 
Maloka, explains the apparent reversal of South Africa’s position on the ICC as 
follows:
South Africa was active in the establishment of the ICC because we thought the body would 
help advance our agenda to transform and democratise the international system. Instead, and to 
our disappointment, the ICC has come to reflect the untransformed international system with 
its one-sided and undemocratic tendencies.37
This builds on a long-standing criticism that the ICC is targeting political leaders in 
Africa while failing to hold accountable those responsible for war crimes in places like 
the Middle East. The ongoing debates around this issue are reflected in seemingly con-
tradictory statements coming out of government and the ruling party. While in a press 
statement the Department of International Relations and Cooperation underlines, ‘The 
Government remains committed to international criminal justice and to cooperate with 
the Court in the pursuit thereof as was envisaged in the Rome Statute’,38 the ANC had 
earlier released a statement that its highest decision-making body, the National Executive 
Committee, ‘is of the view that the ICC is no longer useful to prosecute crimes against 
humanity’.39 Similar to South Africa’s procedural concerns about R2P, this should not be 
interpreted as opposition to the idea of international criminal justice, but rather to the 
way in which the ICC is seen to be operating and doing the bidding of the powerful states 
in the UN Security Council.40
The response by African states to what they perceive to be initiatives that advance 
Western interests and unfairly target African states has been to create alternative institu-
tions. For example, in 2014, it was proposed that the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights create a third chamber that will fulfil a similar function to the ICC. This is similar 
to the creation of the AU’s peace and security architecture that, to a large extent, mirrors 
that of the UN. The decision taken by the BRICS states to create a New Development 
Bank is another example of the way in which states that feel excluded from the decision-
making process in existing institutions of global governance see no other option but to 
create alternative structures. These developments present a major challenge to the future 
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of global governance as we know it, but should also be seen as an opportunity to address 
the shortcomings of what remains essentially a Western-dominated system of interna-
tional order.
Constraints on South Africa’s R2P stance
As highlighted earlier, South Africa operates in a complex multilateral setting, and its 
membership of a range of international and regional organisations – including the UN, 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the AU, together with its multiple identities – it 
is, among others, an African state, a regional hegemon, a spokesperson for the develop-
ing world and a liberal democracy – all place different obligations on it, forcing a trade-
off of values. Both critics and government officials often employ this argument to explain 
or justify South Africa’s apparently incoherent policy decisions. In recent years, how-
ever, this argument has been weakened by the fact that there has been a clear shift towards 
prioritising particular identities and their related values, namely, African and anti-West-
ern identities. For example, warnings about the damage that certain actions – such as 
allowing President al-Bashir to leave the country in contravention of South Africa’s obli-
gations under the Rome Status to arrest him – can do to the country’s international repu-
tation are increasingly dismissed. While criticised by Western powers and NGOs, South 
Africa’s actions – it is argued – are welcomed by its African counterparts and important 
allies such as China and Russia. This is, of course, not surprising given the ANC’s his-
torical suspicion of the Western international community, particularly the United States 
and the United Kingdom, on account of its role in supporting the apartheid government 
until the mid-1980s. One could therefore contend instead that the shift in South Africa’s 
position on R2P is directly related to changes in the ruling party about the country’s for-
eign policy identity and concomitant interests, values and priorities. While for the first 
decade after apartheid, the new government was still navigating its way through the 
murky waters of international alliances, it would seem as though there is now a much 
clearer perception of what the state’s foreign policy priorities are, and who it should align 
itself with. In particular, this has meant a shift away from the previous focus on the pro-
motion of human rights as an essential element of its then predominantly liberal demo-
cratic identity, which has progressively been eroded both by domestic and international 
developments. Growing interest from emerging powers like China has allowed South 
Africa to reduce its dependence on its traditional Western partners and their expectations 
of foreign policy behaviour. This has been accompanied by intensified domestic pres-
sures to address the country’s economic challenges through a foreign policy focused first 
and foremost on economic interests, often to the detriment of other values like human 
rights promotion.
Related to this, while South Africa often justifies its preference for negotiated solu-
tions to conflict rather than intervention as a matter of principle, there are also other, 
more pragmatic, reasons. First, there is currently a lack of political will: in the face of 
high levels of poverty, inequality, crime and service delivery protests, government’s pri-
ority is meeting domestic developmental goals. Second, the country suffers from a seri-
ous lack of capacity to enforce R2P – it is simply not in a position to take on global or 
even responsibilities that will require it to channel more resources into military 
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operations. One of the defining features of a regional power,41 a label often ascribed to 
South Africa, is the ability to manage security in its region. While South Africa has com-
mitted a substantial amount of resources to various efforts to address conflicts on the 
continent – it has been an active mediator in, among others, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Burundi and Sudan and has served in 14 international peace opera-
tions on the continent42 – the 2014 Defence Review confirms that South Africa can now 
only afford to deploy 3000 troops to peacekeeping missions.43 In light of the fact that it 
remains one of the most powerful states in Africa and continuously emphasises the 
importance of regional responses to threats to peace and security, together with the high 
likelihood that many, if not most, future humanitarian crises that might warrant an R2P 
response will be in Africa, South Africa cannot afford to be overly enthusiastic about 
supporting intervention on the basis of protecting human rights. Ultimately, South Africa 
is caught between a rock and hard place. It supports the broad notion of R2P, within the 
African context, but at the same time is suspicious of outside intervention on the conti-
nent. This means that any legitimate intervention can only come from within Africa. In 
light of continued constraints on African resources, with few exceptions, R2P as con-
structive engagement rather than military intervention seems to be the only viable form 
of responsibility South Africa is willing and able to take on for the time being.
Similarly, while the AU has been a trendsetter with regard to institutionalising R2P, its 
track record when it comes to implementation has been less than stellar.44 In terms of 
peacekeeping, which is arguably one of the most visible elements of R2P, the UN remains 
the continent’s principal peacekeeper. This is partly due to the fact that African states still 
lack the capacity and resources for effective implementation, something that was clearly 
seen in the Libyan case. While the AU was critical of NATO’s involvement, it was obvi-
ous that the continent lacked the necessary resources and political will to take action 
without international involvement. In the end, however, the Libyan intervention has 
served to revive the long-held suspicions of the motivations behind Western interven-
tions in Africa. Despite early optimism about the progress made in Africa with regard to 
internalising the new R2P norm, Africa and Pretorius’ assessment that ‘it was obvious 
from the start that the introduction of a new normative framework would result in its 
uncomfortable coexistence with competing or pre-existing norms or arrangements’45 is 
now all too fitting. Driving the point home even further and based on interviews con-
ducted at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Zähringer46 concludes that the R2P is 
politically dead within the organisation. This, however, overstates African opposition to 
the norm of R2P. As noted above, it is not that South Africa and most other African states 
are against the principle that the international society has certain responsibilities towards 
ensuring that civilian lives are protected in all states, but rather that they disagree about 
the procedural issues of who decides when and how those responsibilities should be 
exercised.47
Conclusion
This article has shown that South Africa is committed to the principle of the protection 
of civilians, although it favours a multi-layered, moderate approach to implementing 
R2P, focusing on a regional approach, and conflict prevention and resolution through 
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dialogue and engagement. This does not mean that it is categorically opposed to the use 
of force, but it is concerned about it being used as a pretext for regime change. 
Furthermore, the apparent contradictions in South Africa’s position on R2P are consist-
ent with the broader tensions in its foreign policy. These include a constitutional commit-
ment to promoting and protecting human rights, solidarity with African states and a 
desire to reform what is regarded as an inequitable system of global governance, where 
principles like R2P are inconsistently applied by the powerful states. It is argued that 
these contradictions are becoming fewer and that a new consensus seems to be emerging 
about where South Africa’s future alliances lie and what the implications are for its for-
eign policy.
In thinking about a way forward, the ideational role of states like South Africa and its 
India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) partners is significant. As Kuwali48 
points out, one of the challenges of operationalising R2P is conceptual: there needs to be 
more clarity around what exactly it is. If R2P is seen as a Western concept that is being 
imposed on non-Western states, then perhaps the discussion needs to shift its focus. In a 
similar vein, Brockmeier and Rotman argue that ‘it is not useful to frame debates on the 
protection of people from atrocities under the strict label of the Responsibility to 
Protect’.49 There needs to be extensive engagement with broader debates around, for 
example, the effectiveness of the use of force in protecting civilians, the relationship 
between peace and justice and the efficacy of mediation and other non-coercive forms of 
conflict resolution such as preventive diplomacy. South Africa started this process in 
2008 when, as chair of the UN Security Council’s Working Group on Conflict Prevention, 
it attempted to develop a broader understanding of R2P and to link it more explicitly to 
conflict prevention and resolution.50 Importantly, as Beresford51 points out, South 
Africa’s approach to conflict resolution and transitional justice offers an alternative to 
the type of intervention that was seen in Libya. Geldenhuys52 raises another related ques-
tion, namely, whether R2P should continue to be confined to the four mass atrocities 
(genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing). He contends that 
most such atrocities are preceded by a systematic violation of human rights, suggesting 
that the focus should be on prevention and early warning, which, of course, is easier said 
than done. This is also linked to Mamdani’s point that R2P, as it is currently understood, 
places too much focus on particular types of mass violence. Another way of salvaging 
the principles underlying R2P would be to encourage the development of alternative and 
related concepts such as responsibility while protecting, of which the global South can 
take ownership. It has been noted that emerging powers want recognition, consultation 
and inclusion in decision-making processes, and drawing on bridging concepts devel-
oped in the south, without claiming them for the north, would be one step in the right 
direction.
Another debate central to the issue and also related to the ICC is the apparent tension 
between lasting peace and security and justice and accountability. Instead of increasingly 
distancing themselves from R2P, states like South Africa should be leading initiatives to 
reframe the debate and push for revisions that are more acceptable to those who currently 
object to it. This would be in line with the ANC government’s commitment to interna-
tional law, as well as its stated desire to reform institutions of global governance to make 
them more equitable and representative of the interests and concerns of developing 
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states. South Africa is in a unique position to advance a more multi-dimensional, inclu-
sive version of R2P, being a natural intermediary between the west, emerging powers and 
the global south, and Africa in particular. It would be shortsighted to forgo such an 
opportunity to make a real contribution to global governance for the sake of outdated 
ideological reasons.
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